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Abstract
In this work, we propose a multi-layer market for vehicle-
to-grid energy trading. In the macro layer, we consider a
double auction mechanism, under which the utility company
act as an auctioneer and energy buyers and sellers interact.
This double auction mechanism is strategy-proof and con-
verges asymptotically. In the micro layer, the aggregators,
which are the sellers in the macro layer, are paid with com-
missions to sell the energy of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles
(PHEVs) and to maximize their utilities. We analyze the
interaction between the macro and micro layers and study
some simplified cases. Depending on the elasticity of supply
and demand, the utility is analyzed under different scenarios.
Simulation results show that our approach can significantly
increase the utility of PHEVs.
1 Introduction
The rising oil prices combined with the ongoing trend for de-
veloping environmental-friendly technological solutions, im-
plies that electrically-operated vehicles will lie at the heart of
future transportation systems. In particular, it is envisioned
that plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), which are es-
sentially electric vehicles equipped with storage devices, will
constitute one key component towards realizing the vision
of green, environment-friendly transportation networks. For
instance, it is forecast that up to 2.7 million electric vehicles
will be put on the road in the United States, by 2020 [1].
The presence of energy storage devices implies that PHEVs
can not only serve as a green means of transportation, but
also, if properly configured, they can function as a “moving”
energy reservoir that can store and, possibly, supply power
back to the power grid. While current PHEV deployment
are mostly concerned with grid-to-vehicle interactions, en-
abling two-way vehicle-to-grid (V2G) interactions between
the grid and PHEVs, has recently started to receive consid-
erable attention both in research and standardization agen-
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cies [2, 3, 4, 5, 6] and is expected to lie at the heart of the
emerging smart grid system.
Enabling V2G interactions has several advantages such as
serving as backup power sources during outages or supply-
ing ancillary services back to the grid for regulation services.
However, in order to fully reap the benefits of V2G systems,
several key challenges must be addressed at different level
such as control, communications, charging behavior, imple-
mentation, and market mechanisms. In [7], the authors pro-
pose a scheme that uses PHEV batteries to absorb the ran-
domness in intermittent wind power generation. The authors
in [8] study the use of game theory for providing frequency
regulation through V2G operation. Using the PHEVs as
storage units is studied and analyzed in [9] while communi-
cation architectures suitable for V2G systems are discussed
in [10]. Further, the authors in [11] considers the problem
of optimally providing energy and ancillary services using
electric vehicles.
Clearly, most existing work are focused on implementa-
tion, communication, and energy transfer in V2G systems.
However, the need for energy transfer and exchange from
PHEVs to the grid has also an economical aspect that must
be addressed. In this respect, the work in [12] sheds a light
on this aspect by investigating the price and quantities ex-
changed if the PHEVs and the grid elements form an energy
trade market. Beyond [12], little work seems to have been
focused on the economics of V2G exchanges which are essen-
tial for a better understanding on the potential of using V2G
in future power grid systems.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a gen-
eral framework and algorithm for studying the economics of
the market emerging between PHEVs, aggregators, and the
smart grid elements. To address this problem, we propose
a multi-layered market mechanisms in which the agregga-
tors, the PHEVs, and the grid elements can decide on the
quantity and prices at which they wish to trade energy while
optimizing the tradeoff between the benefits (e.g., revenues)
and costs from this energy exchange. In this proposed mar-
ket, first, the aggregators and the smart grid elements (e.g.,
substations) submit their reservation prices and bids so as to
agree on a price and energy trading mechanism. These in-
teractions are modeled using a double auction whose result
is then fed back into the second layer, which deals with the
management of PHEV resources at each aggregator. In this
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Figure 1: The two-layer market model. The numbers in the
figure correspond to the step numbers in Algorithm 1.
layer, within each PHEV group, the aggregator negotiates
with the PHEVs to settle for an agreement on the resource
usage. In particular, the aggregator will announce its energy
buying price to the PHEVs, and each PHEV determines how
much energy it is willing to supply to the aggregator. The
outcome of this layer is directly linked to the previous market
due to the fact that the aggregator has to carefully balance
its earnings from the energy market and its payments to the
PHEVs within its group. Hence, unlike existing work such
as in [12], the proposed scheme depends, not only on pricing
issues, but also on modeling the PHEVs-to-aggregator inter-
actions (from an economical perspective) as well as on pro-
viding incentives for the PHEVs to participate in the foreseen
market and, hence, it can leverage V2G, for improving the
overall smart grid performance. We characterize the equilib-
ria resulting from the proposed multi-layered market and we
show their existence. Further, using linear approximation
techniques we provide a large-system analysis on the eco-
nomics of V2G energy trading. Using simulations, we assess
the properties and performance of the energy trading mecha-
nisms resulting from proposed scheme and we show that our
approach can significantly increase the utility of PHEVs.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present
the proposed system model. In Section 3, we analyze the
system for different PHEV energy supply costs. Simulation
results are discussed and analyzed in Section 4 while conclu-
sions are drawn in Section 5.
2 The Model and the Market Mech-
anism
Consider a smart grid system consisting of K grid elements
(e.g., substations) with K = {1, . . . ,K} denoting the set of
all such elements. In this grid, N electric vehicles aggregators
are deployed. We let N = {1, . . . , N} denote the set of all
aggregators. Each aggregator n ∈ N manages a group of
PHEVs denoted by In = {1, . . . , In}. In this model, we are
particularly interested in smart grid elements that are unable
to meet their demand and, hence, need to buy energy from
alternative sources such as the PHEV aggregators. Hence,
hereinafter, all grid elements are referred to as buyers while
the aggregators are referred to as sellers.
The energy exchange process between the aggregators and
the grid elements is modeled using a two-layered market
model as shown in Fig. 1 with the utility company’s control
center acting as a middleman that handles the prospective
energy trading mechanisms. On the one hand, at the first
layer, referred to as the macro layer, the aggregators and the
grid elements interact so as to trade energy. At this layer,
the buyers wish to optimize their performance and meet their
demand by buying energy from the PHEVs through the ag-
gregators while the aggregators wish to strategically choose
their price and quantity to trade so as to optimize their rev-
enues. On the other hand, at the second layer, referred to
as the micro layer, the aggregators must interact with the
PHEVs so as to optimize the energy resources and provide
incentives for the PHEVs to actually participate in the trade.
Clearly, the outcomes of these two layers are coupled and,
thus, any market solution must take into account this inter-
layer dependence. Below, we discuss and analyze, in details,
the market operation at each layer.
2.1 Macro Layer
An auction is a mechanism for buying or selling goods or
services by taking bids and then selling them to the high-
est bidders. The main approach to study this mechanism
is game theory by considering the bidders as the players of
this game, and their bids as their strategies. For more de-
tails on auction theory see [13]. For the completeness of
this work, here we give an overview of the double auction
mechanism [14, 15, 12]. In this layer, each potential seller
or aggregator n ∈ N sends the quantity of energy An that
it intends to supply and its reservation price Sn to the auc-
tioneer. The reservation price sent by the potential sellers
corresponds to the minimum price at which the seller is will-
ing to sell its offered amount of energy. Each buyer k ∈ K
proposes a bid Bk and the quantity it requests, denoted by
Xk, to the auctioneer. Here, we are mainly focused on the
interactions between buyers and sellers in a certain window
of time during which the bids and reservation prices do not
vary. This can correspond to an energy trading market in
which decisions are based on medium or long-term energy
needs such as in a day-ahead market. In each round, each
aggregator n decides its own An with the fixed Sn. After
receiving all An’s, the auctioneer determines the price P (A)
of the energy, where A = (An, 1 ≤ n ≤ N), and Qn(A),
which corresponds to the total quantity sold by aggregator
n, ∀n ∈ N , by a double auction.
In this work, we adopt a double auction mechanism based
on [14, 12, 16, 15]. In this auction:
• we order the sellers in an increasing order of their reser-
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vation price. W.l.o.g. we consider
S1 < S2 < . . . < SN . (1)
• we order the buyers in a decreasing order of their reser-
vation bids. W.l.o.g. we consider
B1 > B2 > . . . > BK . (2)
• if two sellers (respectively, buyers) have equal reserva-
tion prices (bids), they are aggregated into one single
“virtual” seller (or buyer).
• we generate the supply curve (selling reservation price
Sn versus the amount of energy put out for sale An)
• we generate the demand curve (offered bids Bk versus
quantity needed Xk).
• we find an intersection point.
This intersection is at the level of a certain seller L and
buyer M , such that BM ≥ SL and BM+1 < SL+1. We
find seller L and buyer M and the double auction dictates
that the first L− 1 and M − 1 buyers will participate in the
energy trading. We don’t consider seller L and buyer M in
this trade since it’s a necessary condition for matching the
total supply and demand while maintaining a strategy-proof
mechanism [15].
Thus all sellers with index n < L and all buyers with
index k < M become the participants in the double auction
so as to clear the market. In consequence, the trading prices
for the sellers and the buyers can be chosen within any point
in the range [SL, BM ] [16]. In this work, for any strategy
choice A (or An,∀n ∈ N ) by the sellers (i.e. aggregators),
given seller L and buyer M at the intersection, we consider
all sellers i < L and buyers k < M trade at a price P (A),
given by
P (A) =
SL(A) +BM (A)
2
, (3)
where the dependence on A is due to the fact that each A
can give different interaction points with the demand and
supply curves, and thus we can have different L and M .
At the end of the auction, numerous criteria can be used
for determining the amount of traded energy between each
one of the L − 1 sellers and M − 1 buyers. We adopt the
approach of [15] in which the volume is divided in such a
way as to ensure a strategy-proof auction. Using the method
in [15] the total quantity Qn(A) sold by any PHEV group n,
for a given choice A is:
Qn(A) =
 An if
∑M−1
k=1 Xk ≥
∑n
j=1Aj ,
(An −Ψ)+ if n = L− 1,
0 if n > L− 1,
(4)
where (x)+ = max{0, x} and Ψ is the oversupply, i.e., Ψ =∑L−1
j=1 Aj −
∑M−1
k=1 Xk.
2.2 Micro Layer
In this layer, each aggregator announces a price pn to its
PHEVs by
pn = γnP (A),∀n ∈ N , (5)
where 0 < γn < 1 is the commission rate. The price differ-
ence, P (A)−pn, is the commission (i.e., cost of management)
earned by aggregator n from its managed PHEVs. Each
aggregator can make a profit in this way and thus it has
an incentive to help its PHEVS participate in the market.
This provides an incentive for an aggregator to maximize
its PHEVs’ profits. By utility maximization, each PHEV
i ∈ In determines its available supply ai ∈ [0, amaxi ] according
to its utility where amaxi characterizes the amount of energy
the owner of PHEV i can afford to sell, i.e., after reserving
enough for its own use. For the same type of vehicle, a PHEV
which needs more reservation for its proper operation has a
lower amaxi . We have
An =
In∑
i=1
ai,∀n ∈ N . (6)
Let an = (ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ In) be the strategy of the PHEVs
in group i. Aggregator n determines the actual quantity
qi(an, Qn(A)) allocated to PHEV i in group n proportional
to ai by
qi(an, Qn(A)) =
ai∑
i∈In ai
×Qn(A), (7)
and thus
Qn(A) =
In∑
i=1
qi(an, Qn(A)),∀n ∈ N . (8)
Consider that each PHEV i ∈ In imposes a cost of dis-
charging its battery to supply energy to its aggregator. We
denote this cost by ci(a), where a is the amount of energy
sold by PHEV i. We assume that during each transaction,
each PHEV will try to maximize its profit by choosing the
amount of energy ai to be
ai = arg max
ai
{pn(an)− ci(ai)}.
2.3 Market Mechanism
The interaction between the macro and micro layers can be
seen as a market mechanism or an algorithm, shown in Algo-
rithm 1, which is used to find the market equilibrium P ∗, A∗n.
It terminates when a pre-determined number of iterations
tmax has been reached or the percentage change of the mar-
ket price is less than a certain threshold ξ.
As we can see in simulation later, Algorithm 1 performs
very efficiently and converges within a few steps.
3
Algorithm 1 Market Mechanism
1: For all k, buyer k submits its bid Bk and its requested
amount Xk to the auctioneer
2: t← 1
3: repeat
4: For all n, aggregator n submits its reservation price Sn
and its proposed supply An to the auctioneer
5: The auctioneer implements a double auction and deter-
mines the market price P (t) and the allocated quantity
Qn for aggregator n for all n
6: For each aggregator n, the selling price pn is announced
to its PHEVs
7: For each PHEV i, it determines its proposed selling
amount ai by maximizing its utility according to pn
and returns ai back to its aggregator
8: Each aggregator n sums up all ai’s from its PHEVs
9: t← t+ 1
10: until t > tmax or |P (t)−P (t−1)
P (t)
| < ξ
3 Linear Approximation for Large
systems
In a practical smart grid, both the number of PHEVs and
smart grid element are expected to be large. In this respect,
it is of interest to analyze the impact of the presence of large
numbers of buyers and aggregators on the overall proposed
market mechanism. Therefore, here, we consider the situ-
ations when N and M are sufficiently large such that the
corresponding supply and demand curves can be approxi-
mated by a linear function, depending on the distribution
of aggregators’ reservation price (buyers’ bids). We assume
that the reservation prices Sn from each one can be ordered
nicely into a line with each point being one unit apart. Fig. 2
shows one example of the supply and demand curves, each
of which is approximated by one single linear function. In
the following, since the focus of this paper is on the supply
side, we study different types of supply curves while always
keeping the demand curve of the same type.
3.1 Linear Cost Function with Homoge-
neous PHEVs
In this subsection, we consider that the cost function of
PHEV i is a linear function with respect to the amount of
energy it provides, i.e., ci(a) = ηia, within a certain inter-
val [0, amaxi ]. If the amount of energy to be sold exceeds a
max
i ,
the cost will become infinite. Note that this case also takes
into account the inconvenience cost (e.g., when the PHEV
does not have enough energy to operate normally). Then its
utility function is given by ui(a) = (γnP−ηi)a. The problem
PHEV i needs to address is the following:
u∗i = maximize
ai∈[0,amaxi ]
ui(ai). (9)
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Figure 2: Supply and demand curves
We note that, a PHEV can always decide not to participate in
the market in which case it maximum utility will be u∗i = 0.
As a result, the maximum utility in (9) is always nonnegative.
In this case, the solution a∗i of (9) is
a∗i =
{
amaxi if ηi ≥ pn,
0 else.
(10)
We can then subdivide the set of PHEVs In in two dis-
joint sets I(1)n and I(2)n , such that I(1)n ∪ I(2)n = In, where
a∗i = 0,∀i ∈ I(1)n , and a∗i = amaxi ,∀i ∈ I(2)n . Thus, we obtain
An =
∑
i∈In
ai =
∑
i∈I(1)n
ai +
∑
i∈I(2)n
ai. (11)
Since for all i ∈ I(1)n , a∗i = 0, then
∑
i∈I(1)n ai = 0, and in
consequence
An =
∑
i∈I(2)n
ai =
∑
i∈I(2)n
amaxi . (12)
3.1.1 Linear Approximation
Consider the linear case as in Fig. 2(b). The PHEVs are
price takers and the supply and demand curves are given by
Supply(P,Q) = αP, (13)
Demand(P,Q) = Q0 − βP. (14)
Here Q0 is the total demand from all the buyers and P is
the price determined from the double auction in the macro
layer. Also, α will depend on I(2)n for all aggregator n. In
that case, the equilibrium price P ∗ and the quantity sold Q∗
can be determined when the supply meets the demand, i.e.,
Supply(P ∗, Q∗) = Demand(P ∗, Q∗)⇒ αP ∗ = Q0 − βP ∗,
or equivalently, when
P ∗ =
Q0
α+ β
. (15)
The utility for each PHEV i in group n will be thus given by
4
1. If ηi ≥ γnQ0(α+β) then a∗i = 0 and u∗i = 0.
2. If ηi <
γnQ0
(α+β) then a
∗
i = a
max
i and
u∗i = (γnP
∗ − ηi) a∗i =
(
γnQ0
(α+ β)
− ηi
)
amaxi . (16)
The total utility Un of aggregator n is given by
Un =
∑
i∈I(2)n
(
γnQ0
(α+ β)
− ηi
)
amaxi . (17)
From this simple example, we can deduce the following
properties:
1. If the supply slope of a market 1 is higher than that
of a market 2, i.e., α1 > α2, then the utility gained in
market 1 is smaller than that in market 2.
2. If the demand slope of a market 1 is higher than that
of a market 2, i.e., β1 > β2, then the utility gained in
market 1 is smaller than that in market 2.
3. If the total possible demand of a market 1 is higher than
that of a market 2, i.e., Q10 > Q
2
0, then the utility gained
in market 1 is greater than that in market 2.
3.2 Quadratic Cost Function
We first recall that under the quadratic cost model, each
PHEV i will supply the following amount of energy:
a∗i =
[
pn(an)− ηi
2υi
]amaxi
0
. (18)
In order to make the analysis easier, below we assume that
a∗i ≤ amaxi for all i. Then, we have:
a∗i =
pn(an)− ηi
2υi
, and A∗n = Cnpn(an)− dn, (19)
where
Cn =
∑
i
1
2υi
and dn =
∑
i
ηi
2υi
. (20)
In this case, A∗n is the supply from one aggregator and A
∗
n is
the slope of the supply curve, i.e., α = A∗n. Thus, we have
by (15) that:
P ∗ =
Q0
A∗n + β
. (21)
Hence, we see that there is an iteration process of the market
price, which approximates the actual price iteration:
• In iteration t, with An(t) computed, we obtain the op-
timal price P ∗(t) = Q0An(t)+β .
• In iteration t+ 1, we compute the new supply quantity
by (19), i.e., An(t+ 1) = CnγnP
∗(t)− dn.
Based on the above observation, we have the following simple
lemma characterizing the necessary conditions under which
there exists market equilibriums, i.e., (19) and (21) both
hold.
Lemma 1. The following conditions are necessary for the
above iteration process converges to an market equilibrium
(P ∗, A∗n):
(β + dn)
2 − 4(dnβ − CnQ0) ≥ 0,∀n ∈ N (22)
(β − dn)2 + 4CnQ0 ≥ 0,∀n ∈ N . 3 (23)
Proof. In equilibrium, this price must result in a supply that
is exactly equal to the resulting An, i.e.,
An =
CnQ0γn
An + β
− dn. (24)
This gives rise to the following condition on An:
A2n + (β + dn)An + βdn − CnγnQ0 = 0. (25)
Note that the above argument also shows an interesting fact
that there is an implicit iteration for the market price P as
follows:
P ∗ =
Q0
CnγnP ∗ − dn + β . (26)
This similarly implies that the fixed point should be:
CnγnP
∗2 + (β − dn)P ∗ −Q0 = 0. (27)
Since both (25) and (27) are quadratic functions, we see that
the only way there exists a market equilibrium is when (22)
and (23) hold.
In the next section, we will show how the algorithm evolves
through simulation and demonstrate the intuition behind the
iteration process.
4 Simulation Results
For simulations, we consider a smart grid network in which
a number of aggregators sell their energy surplus to smart
grid elements (buyers) through a utility company. The sim-
ulation setting is as follows. Each aggregator manages a
certain number of PHEVs, randomly generated in the range
of [500, 1000]. Each PHEV has a maximum battery capacity
of 250 miles with power consumption 22kWh per 100 miles
[17, 18] out of which an arbitrary amount of energy, between
30 and 100 miles, is reserved for the PHEV’s private use. The
reservation prices of the aggregators are uniformly selected
in [10, 50] dollars/MWh while the buyers’ bids are randomly
chosen from [15, 60] dollars/MWh. Each buyer requests en-
ergy demand with the amount chosen in [20, 60] MWh. The
commission rate is set to γn = 0.91,∀n ∈ N . Each PHEV
i has random cost function parameters ηi ∈ [10, 50] and
υi ∈ [1000, 2000] for quadratic cost function and βi = 0 for
the linear cost function. The algorithm always starts by set-
ting ai = a
max
i ,∀i ∈ In,∀n ∈ N .
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Figure 3: Basic simulations for small numbers of buyers and
aggregators.
4.1 Small Numbers of Buyers and Aggrega-
tors
We simulate the cases with small numbers of buyers and ag-
gregators. We consider 5 buyers (K = 5) in each case and we
compare our two-layer approach with a greedy approach, in
which each PHEV always proposes to sell amaxi . Fig. 3 shows
the average results of 1000 independent simulation runs for
each case. Figs. 3(a) and 3(b) present the average utility per
aggregator corresponding to the linear and quadratic cost
functions, respectively. We can see that our approach al-
ways gives higher average utility than the greedy one, as
shown in Figs. 3(a) and 3(b). In the cases of linear cost, we
can see that the average utility start by increasing with N
but then, it starts to decrease when the number of aggrega-
tors reaches that of buyers (N = 6). This result is due to the
fact that, for small N , an increase in the number of partic-
ipating aggregators leads to a larger amount of energy sold
which, subsequently, improves the average utility. However,
(a) Total utility in each iteration
1
2
3
4
5
Demand
(b) Supply and demand curves
Figure 4: Linear cost function with 1000 buyers (K) and 1000
aggregators (N)
when N ≥ 6, an increase in the number of aggregators N will
yield a decrease in the settled price which leads to a decrease
in the utility. In the cases with quadratic cost, the average
utility increases with N on the grounds that more aggrega-
tors participate in the market resulting in a larger amount
of total energy sold. Hence, in general, the equilibrium trad-
ing price decreases with N as more aggregators lead to an
increased competition, which subsequently imposes a lower
market price.
Fig. 3(c) shows the average number of iterations required
to reach an equilibrium. Clearly, as more aggregators partici-
pate in the market, the number of iterations till convergence
increases. Moreover, Fig. 3(c) shows that the convergence
time is faster in the case with quadratic cost. With a linear
cost function, each PHEV i takes either 0 or amaxi in each
iteration, and thus, the algorithm is more like to oscillate
more around the equilibrium point before convergence. With
a quadratic cost function, due to the concavity of the utility,
the algorithm moves toward the equilibrium in a smoother
manner which is further corroborated in the subsequent sim-
ulations.
4.2 Large Numbers of Buyers and Aggrega-
tors
Here, we simulate cases in which a large number of buyers
(K = 1000) and aggregators (N = 1000) are deployed so
as to verify the analytical results induced from the linear
approximation studied in Section 3.1. As previously men-
tioned, when N (K) increases, the supply (demand) curve
approaches a linear function as all random numbers are gen-
erated uniformly. We first study the results with a fixed
demand curve (i.e. with β and Q0 fixed) and they corre-
spond to the situations when the value evolves in a partic-
ular simulation. Fig. 41 shows the results for linear PHEV
cost functions when the algorithm iterates. Fig. 4(a) gives
the total utility computed from double auction for each iter-
ation while we have the corresponding supply and demand
curves in Fig. 4(b) ( the part shows intersection points only).
We can see that the total utility decreases with the supply
1The numbers in Subfigure (b) correspond to iteration/case numbers
in Subfigure (a). For clearer demonstration, In Subfigure (b), only the
curves corresponding to the first few iterations/cases are given.
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Figure 5: Quadratic cost function with 1000 buyers (K) and
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Figure 6: Fixed Q0 with 1000 buyers (K) and 1000 aggrega-
tors (N)
slope (α). For example, we consider iterations 1 and 2. α1 is
larger than α2 and we have the utility gained in iteration 1 is
smaller than that in iteration 2. We also study the quadratic
PHEV cost functions and the similar results are shown in
Fig. 5.1 However, with the quadratic cost function, the al-
gorithm converges faster and smoother. Next we study the
results for six different demand curves with a fixed supply
curve (i.e. α fixed). Fig. 61 shows the six cases with a fixed
Q0. The simulation also aligns the results deduced in Section
3.1: the larger β, the smaller the utility.
5 Conclusion
We have studied the V2G energy trading market, in which
PHEVs sell their excessive energy to some loads in the dis-
tribution network. We have proposed a multi-layer system
to coordinate the trading where those PHEVs in a close ge-
ographical area are represented by an aggregator. In the
macro layer, the energy buyers and the aggregators engage
in a double auction to determine the trading price and the
actual energy quantity sold for each aggregator. In the micro
layer, each aggregator helps its managed PHEVs maximize
their utilities. A mechanism is proposed to coordinate the
interaction between the macro and micro layers. We have
analyzed the system performance when the numbers of buy-
ers and aggregators are large. Simulation results show that
our mechanism is always better than the greedy approach
and verify some of our analytical results.
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